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There has long been an active debate in Haiti—as in many other developing countries—
over whether or not the customary tenure system constrains technology adoption and 
agricultural development, and whether cadaster and land titling should be national priorities.  
This paper contributes to this debate by reviewing and interpreting the body of literature and 
new empirical evidence concerning the relationship between land tenure and the adoption of 
technology in rural Haiti.  The findings suggest that (a) formal title is not necessarily more secure 
than informal arrangements, (b) informal arrangements based on traditional social capital 
resources assure affordable and flexible access to land for most people, and (c) perceived 
stability of access to land—via stability of personal and social relationships—is a more 
important determinant of technology adoption than mode of access.  The paper concludes that 
there is no definitive relationship between tenure and technology adoption by peasants; peasants 
are preoccupied more by political and economic insecurity than insecure tenure; and rather than 
tinkering with formalizing tenure, policy makers should prioritize other more fundamental rural 
sector reforms.  The paper ends by considering some of the implications for theory and suggests 
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
Experts commonly cite Haiti’s complex land tenure system as a key constraint—
sometimes the key constraint—to agricultural intensification and rural development.  These 
claims have led to calls for national cadastral survey and titling programs to update the formal 
land tenure system and unleash the rural sector (see USAID 1985, World Bank 1991, IDB 
1992, FAO 1991 and 1995, APAP 1995, Nathan 1995, FAO/INARA 1997, MARNDR 
1992, Renaud 1934, Victor 1993).  At least one pilot cadaster and titling program has been 
established, and major new investments in land reform are under consideration.  The 
conventional wisdom holds that Haiti’s tenure system constrains peasant investment and 
adoption of technology since a majority of parcels are informally divided and the formal system 
for administering tenure is ineffective.   
These arguments correspond to prevailing property rights theory as represented by 
Boserup (1965) and Demsetz (1967)—that private, individualized tenure is the most efficient in 
situations of land scarcity.  On the other hand, the empirical evidence suggests that the informal 
                                                 
1 Glenn R. Smucker is a Cultural Anthropologist from Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
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3 Michael Bannister is Assistant Director, Productive Land Use Systems Project, for the 





system appears reasonably efficient from a peasant perspective, and has evolved in response to 
other pertinent factors.   
The findings described in this paper support Baland and Platteau’s claim (1998) that 
prevailing property rights theory underappreciates three important variables: the role of the state, 
social capital, and the distributional concerns of local people.  The evidence suggests that land 
scarcity in Haiti is acute, and labor—in simple, aggregate terms—is in abundant supply; 
however, access to labor remains a critical issue for most Haitian peasants.  In this rural context 
of extreme cash scarcity, labor serves as the primary medium of exchange.  Access to a 
colleague’s labor is, on the margin, more important than access to land.   
Empirical evidence from Haiti challenges the proposition that direct interventions to 
reform tenure—especially large-scale cadastral survey and titling—should be a priority for rural 
Haiti.  Instead, more fundamental reforms must first be addressed.  Furthermore, the evidence 
shows that peasant social relations support agricultural intensification even in the absence of 
formalized property rights and titles.   
The purpose of this paper is to contribute clarity to this debate by reviewing and 
interpreting the body of literature concerning relationships between land tenure and the adoption 
of technology in rural Haiti.  The paper first summarizes the modern context of peasant 
production and Haiti’s statutory and customary tenure systems.  The paper then reviews the 
results of previous studies on tenure and adoption, and the recent national household Baseline 
Survey of food security commissioned by USAID (BARA 1996a, 1996b, 1997) and analyzed 





from the PADF agroforestry impact survey (Bannister 1998a, 1998b) and concludes with a 
discussion of findings, including implications for theory and future research.  
CONTEXT OF PEASANT PRODUCTION 
In 1804 Haiti became the New World’s second republic and the world’s first nation of 
free citizens to achieve independence from Europe.  A colonial social structure based on acute 
class stratification set the stage for Haiti’s post-independence evolution as a deeply divided 
society.
4  After 1804, the masses of former slaves established themselves as independent 
freeholders—a reconstituted peasantry.
5  Peasant society emerged as largely self-regulating to 
cope with geographic isolation, exclusion from the political system, exploitative market relations, 
regressive taxes, and the virtual absence of state investment in the rural sector.  In response, 
Haitian peasants created a complex network of local institutions to ensure social security and 
channel access to land, labor, and capital.
6 
                                                 
4 See Leyburn (1966), Mintz (1974a), and Farmer (1994) for reviews of colonial 
history and implications for national development; James (1963) and Saint-Louis (1970) on the 
Haitian revolution; Trouillot (1990), Fass (1988); Lundahl (1979, 1983, 1992); and Cadet 
(1996) on Haiti’s political economy and poverty. 
5 Mintz (1974a) coined the term “reconstituted peasantry,” and identified the 
antecedents of peasant production strategies under the slave plantation regime of colonial Saint-
Domingue.  See Leyburn (1941) and Moral (1961) for historical origins and the early evolution 
of Haitian society, and Lundahl (1979) for economic history including the role of land. 
6 For reviews of the emergence and nature of rural institutions see Barthelemy (1989, 
1996) and field ethnographies including Murray (1977), Smucker (1983a), and Woodson 
(1990).  See Lundahl (1992) for a review of the informal system of social security in Haiti, and 






Historically, peasant agriculture has been Haiti’s primary economic activity.  An 
estimated 59 percent of Haiti’s population is rural—one of the highest rates in the region.
7  Most 
farmers in Haiti are mountain peasants with farm units composed of several dispersed field plots. 
Recent national surveys confirm that the vast majority of peasants continue to be owner-
operators by purchase or inheritance (see Table 1); however, average landholdings are small, 
fragmented, and generally of poor quality.
8 
Land, labor, and social relations are the most important assets of the household 
economy.  Peasants actively manage kin ties, fictive kinship (godfatherhood), patron-client 
relations and other special relationships as social capital that can be leveraged for access to 
land, labor and capital.  Cash resources are extremely scarce; farm strategies tend to be labor 
intensive.  Land is the most significant tangible asset and serves as a powerful fulcrum for access 
                                                 
7 Demographic data are based on population projections estimated at 7,630,997 in 
1998.  The most recent national demographic survey (see Cayemittes 1995) was undertaken by 
the Enquête Mortalité, Morbidité et Utilisation des Services (EMMUS-II) of the Institut Haitien 
de l’Enfance (1994/95).  This survey estimated the rural population at around 63 percent in 
1993 and decreasing due to out-migration from rural areas and rapid urban growth, around 4 
percent annually in the capital city.  
8 See Zuvekas (1978) for available census data.  According to national census data of 
1971, the average size of peasant holding is less than 1.5 hectares, and the average plot size is 
less than 0.8 hectares.  The census data on farmland and its distribution may not be reliable.  
The census data do not recognize mixed status categories, nor do they distinguish production 
units from landholding units.  Nevertheless, the census data are indicative of the fragmentation 
and small size of peasant farms.  The recent USAID survey, interpreted by Wiens and Sobrado 
(1998), found that over 90 percent of farmers have access to land and that two-thirds own land 
either through purchase or inheritance.  The average farm size is about 1.7 hectares and these 
farms are comprised of an average of 3.7 dispersed plots.  Farmers average only 0.6 hectares 





to labor and capital resources.  Farmers are acutely aware of micro-site variations, such as 





Table 1: Distribution of modes of access to land
a 
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65.5  32.4  33.1  7.5  8.4  11.9  6.6 
                Bannister 
(1998)
d 
53.2  38.5  14.7  21.0  12.6  10.0  3.3 
                USAID 
(1995)
e 
58.2  38.6  19.7  14.0  12.1  5.5  10.2 
                ADS II 
(1988)
f 
61.0  --  --  13.0  9.0  9.0  7.0 
                Zuvekas 
(1978)
g 
60.0  --  --  --  14.3  14.4  11.1 
               
Notes: 
a  Tenure categories as defined here include direct access to land by virtue of ownership and indirect access 
through tenancy. 
b Ownership is defined as “purchased” plus “divided inheritance” plots.  “Purchased” and “divided 
inheritance” categories do not distinguish formal from informal transactions, and may not have updated title.  
c Data source: USAID food security survey—a nation-wide, area-frame Baseline Survey of 4,026 households 
(BARA 1996a, 1996b, 1997). 
d Data source: PADF/PLUS agroforestry impact study—a list-frame survey of 5,658 plots and 1,540 
households.  The category of  “other” includes leasehold on state lands, and plots controlled by a land 
“manager” for absentee landlords. 
e Data source:  Interim Food Security Information System (IFSIS)—a nationwide, area-frame sample of 5,000 
agricultural parcels.  In this survey, the “other” category includes “gift” (1.32%) and “other arrangements” 
(8.87%). 
f Data source: Agricultural Development Support Project (ADS II, 1988)—a nation-wide, area-frame sample 
of 1,307,000 parcels.  In this survey, the “other” category includes “rental from state” (4%), “without title” 
(2%), and “other” (1%).  The “ownership” category includes purchased and divided inheritance lands. 
g Data source: Institut Haïtien des Statistiques (HIS)—a nation-wide census of 1,484,385 plots.  In this survey, 






patterns to manage risk and spread out harvest cycles.  As a strategy for survival, most peasants 
tend to focus on reducing risk rather than maximizing production.  Managing a peasant 
household’s stock of social capital is the key element of this strategy.
9 
Recent surveys indicate that 81 percent of rural households fall below the poverty line.
10 
This alarming level of poverty reflects a precipitous decline in Haitian agriculture.  Production 
per capita dropped 33 percent since 1980 and agriculture’s contribution to GNP dropped from 
47 percent in the 1970s to 24 percent in 1996.
11  This abrupt decline coincides with acute land 
scarcity, the closing of the agricultural frontier, and prolonged political and economic crisis in 
Haiti since the mid-1980s.  The agricultural sector is significantly decapitalized and there is 
limited public investment in rural infrastructure.  A shortage of off-farm employment opportunity 
heightens the extent of rural poverty.  Despite recent efforts to decentralize and democratize the 
                                                 
9 The literature on Haitian peasants includes numerous references to risk management, 
agricultural strategies focused on survival issues and food security, and the importance of 
retaining a diversity of plots, cultigens and income sources.  See Smucker (1983a, 1983b), 
Ehrlich et al. (1985), BARA (1997), Kermel-Torres and Roca (1993), Gagnon (1998), 
Zuvekas (1978), Wiens and Sobrado (1998), Moral (1961), and SACAD and FAMV 
(1994b). 
10 See Wiens and Sobrado (1998) on the USAID food security baseline survey (BARA 
1996a, 1996b, 1997).   They find 67 percent of households surveyed below the indigency line, 
81 percent below the poverty line, and only 28 percent of food consumed by peasants as self-
produced.  The indigency line is defined as the local cost of reaching the FAO minimum 
nutritional standard of 2,240 calories daily per capita with a diet that matches the food 
expenditure percentages of the average sample household.  
11 See USAID (1997) among others.  This document also reports a decline of 33 
percent in the number of calories consumed per person per day since 1980.  Further, 
agriculture’s share of total export value fell from around 60 percent in the 1970s to less than 





economy and the state, reform efforts have yet to make a palpable difference in rural areas.  
The peasantry remains in a state of chronic and growing crisis.
12 
 
2.    LAND TENURE SYSTEM 
ORIGINS 
In 1804, the new Haitian state acquired immense holdings by confiscating French 
colonial estates and asserting state ownership of all unclaimed lands.  Informally, newly freed 
slaves established themselves as independent agriculturists in areas of weak government control.  
Victor (1993) estimates that over a third of Haiti’s present territory was settled outside of 
government control.  Between 1807 and 1817, President Pétion distributed 150,000-170,000 
hectares to some 10,000 beneficiaries (Moral 1961).  Land distribution in Haiti today remains 
significantly more egalitarian than elsewhere in the Caribbean and Latin American region 
(Lundahl 1997; Zuvekas 1979). 
OWNERSHIP, LAW AND CUSTOM 
The literature on Haitian land tenure is based primarily on local community studies, old 
census data, especially the census of 1971, and other more recent survey data.  Community 
studies include research in widely dispersed areas of the country, lowland plains, and mountain 
communities.  Review of the literature suggests that categories of access to land are fairly 
                                                 
12 See the World Bank (1998), Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty Reduction.  For a 





standard throughout most of rural Haiti.  The duality of formal and informal systems is applicable 
in all regions of the country.
13 
Identifying characteristics of Haitian land tenure include the following: (1) individual, 
private property is the rule, (2) peasant smallholders predominate over large holdings, (3) the 
majority of peasant farmers are owner-operators of their own land, (4) peasant farms are 
composed of several non-contiguous parcels, (5) most peasants are simultaneously landlords 
and tenants, (6) land is readily bought and sold without updating title, (7) inherited land is 
divided equally among all children of the deceased, (8) farm holdings are built up over the 
course of a lifetime, then divided and dispersed (Oriol 1996; Bloch et al. 1988). 
Land tenure categories discussed in this paper are categories of access rather than 
strictly legal categories based on title or lease contracts.  This includes direct access to land by 
virtue of ownership and indirect access through various forms of tenancy or usufruct.  Table 1 
summarizes overall distribution of agricultural plots by direct and indirect modes of access.  A 
farmer may own, rent, and sharecrop several plots.  Therefore, it is important to distinguish farm 
operations (land use) from its proprietary base (land ownership and control).
14  
Haitian peasant holdings are firmly grounded in the concept of private property.  
Peasant land ownership originates from formal and informal purchase, inheritance, and gifts.  
                                                                                                                                                 
sector is caught in a downward spiral of circular and cumulative causation which slowly 
depresses the standard of living among the peasants.”   
13 See FAO/INARA (1997), Victor (1993), Bloch et al. (1988), Ehrlich (1985), 
Renaud (1984), and Zuvekas (1978). 
14 See Wiens and Sobrado (1998), Bannister (1998), Bloch, Lambert, Singer, and 





According to national surveys, peasant owner-operators own 37 percent of all agricultural 
parcels by purchase, 23 percent via divided inheritance, and 15 percent via undivided 
inheritance  (averages based on Table 1).
15  Other forms of access derive from a variety of 
arrangements including usufruct, non-formalized gifts of land, pre-inheritance, plots controlled by 
land managers for absentee landlords, and leasehold on state land.   
In keeping with the profound dualism of Haitian society, land tenure arrangements are 
marked by two parallel systems—one legal and the other customary.
16  In practice, the two 
systems are interactive and constitute a type of legal pluralism rather than two discrete 
systems.
17  Statutory (legal) land transactions and entitlement rely heavily on documents 
prepared by notaries and updated survey.  In general, peasant land transactions reflect 
skepticism of notaries, land surveyors, and virtually all agents of the state including the judiciary. 
                                                 
15 Findings of INARA (1997), Oriol (1997), Wiens and Sobrado (1998) and Bannister 
(1998a) are consistent with earlier findings.  See Zuvekas (1979) for an earlier compilation of 
studies demonstrating ownership.  
16 See MARNDR (1992), Victor (1989 and 1993), Bloch et al. (1988), and 
Montalvo-Despeignes (1976), among others, on the dualism of law and custom, and reviews of 
Haitian land law and pertinent literature. 
17 See Benda-Beckman (1995) for a definition of legal pluralism drawn from legal 
anthropological studies: “ . . . the simultaneous existence of multiple normative constructions of 





In the customary system, people make land available in response to family obligations, 
special ties to fictive kin (godparenthood), and various forms of clientship (e.g., labor relations, 
personal loans, banking of favors).  Normatively, kinship groups have an obligation to make 
land available to all family members.  Informal (customary) tenure arrangements among peasant 
farmers tend to be self-regulatory.  Peasant farmers occasionally update title to inherited land, 
but ownership rights stem primarily from kinship ties and transactions not regulated by law.  
Most farmers hold land by extra-legal agreements, but owners of informally divided inheritance 
plots may also refer back to master deeds three or four generations removed (Murray 1977; 
Barthélémy 1996). 
There is a lively land market in among peasants in Haiti.  Land sales are driven by 
consumption and the need for cash in a household economy characterized by extreme cash 
scarcity.  In addition to its value as a basic factor of production, land is held as a store of value 
or insurance fund for crisis, illness, burial, ceremonial obligations, schooling, or out-migration 
(Murray 1977; FAO/INARA 1997). 
The recent FAO/INARA study estimates that 95 percent of land sales in rural Haiti 
avoid the formalities prescribed by Haitian law.  There is some evidence that updated title is 
more common in irrigated zones or peri-urban areas subject to high rents and speculative land 
values.  Farmers make every effort to avoid, diminish, or postpone notarial fees, survey costs, 
taxes, and other charges for land registration and updated title.
18  From a  
                                                 





peasant perspective, avoiding surveys also diminishes the risk of land loss due to the high cost of 
surveying and revising current plot lines to conform to old master deeds.  In the Haitian context 
of legal pluralism, formal title is not necessarily more secure than informal arrangements, 
although it is demonstrably more expensive and considerably less flexible than the informal 
system.
19 
In general, patterns of inheritance redistribute family land with the passing of each 
generation.  In both law and custom, all recognized children have equal rights to a share of 
parental land holdings.  The mechanism of inheritance tends to maintain egalitarian distribution of 
land; however, subdivision also perpetuates fragmentation and diminished plot size over time.  
With high population growth, the size of farm units and individual plots has diminished 
dramatically since the nineteenth century.  The effects of fragmentation are mitigated by out-
migration, consolidation of shares (usually by men since women commonly marry out and move 
away from the family land base), and customary restrictions against selling inherited land to 
outsiders (non-kin) (Barthélémy 1966).  Customary norms assure potential access to land by all 
members of the family, but the system rewards family members who stay on the land rather than 
migrating or marrying outside the community.  
Strictly from a legal perspective, the most striking feature of the overall system is the 
prevalence of legally undivided inheritance land, and a general reluctance to update title for land 
transfers.  From a statutory perspective, undivided family inheritance retains  
                                                 
19 See FAO/INARA (1997, Chapter 5.4), FAO/IDB 1998, 24, Oriol (1996), Murray 





its legal status as a single block of land even when subdivided by custom.  Once divided by 
custom, these shares are readily bought and sold informally among heirs. Consequently, the 
percent of legally undivided family inheritance is undoubtedly higher than shown in national 
census and survey data.  Land access categories in Table 1 do not distinguish statutory from 
customary forms of land purchase or inheritance. 
As illustrated in Table 1, about 10 percent of all agricultural plots are accessed via rental 
agreements and 10 percent via sharecropping agreements.  Most sharecroppers are not solely 
dependent on sharecropping.  Peasants generally view sharecropping as a favor to the tenant 
since land and cash are both scarce.  Paying rent in cash is commonly viewed as a favor to the 
landlord—perhaps a relative faced with a heavy burden of funeral debt.  Some tenants retain 
continuous access to rented or sharecropped land for many years.  Others rent land for shorter 
periods when the tenant’s own holdings are in fallow or otherwise occupied (McClain et al. 
1988). 
In the customary system, people also make land available by usufruct, especially to 
kinfolk.  Usufruct may be limited to specific rights such as the right to harvest particular trees or 
bushes (coffee, fruit), grazing, or agricultural use for a single growing season.  Usufruct may also 
take the form of pre-inheritance plots with the understanding that the beneficiary will cover the 
giver’s eventual burial costs.  Some inheritance land remains undivided—even informally—for 
several generations.  In such cases, co-heirs and their descendants may retain joint use rights to 






Leaseholders and squatters on state land are a significant exception to the rule of private 
property.  Oriol (1993) calculates the number of state leaseholders at around 35,000 or roughly 
5 percent of rural households and 10 percent of agricultural land.
20  Peasant leaseholders on 
state lands treat their leases as though they were private property—buying, selling, renting, 
sharecropping, and inheriting their lease rights by customary agreements.
21 
3.    LAND TENURE SECURITY 
In this context of legal pluralism, with the prevalence of informal modes of access to 
land, what ultimately defines land tenure security and insecurity?  From a juridical perspective, 
clear and defensible title derives ultimately from the state.  Clear title should presumably ensure 
long-term access to land, freedom to alienate the asset, and freedom from the threat of eviction.  
As a corollary, juridical insecurity exists when the landowner or land user lacks the necessary 
legal status (clear title, lease) or the institutional means (court system, law enforcement) to 
enforce property and leasing rights.    
By these measures, peasant farmers in Haiti do not enjoy land tenure security.  This 
juridical insecurity stems from contradictions in land law and weak institutions of enforcement.  
First, most peasant landholdings are not covered by updated title.  This is  
                                                 
20 ADS II (1986) estimates 4 percent of agricultural parcels under state leasehold.  
Victor (1993) notes that estimates of state land vary from 100,000 to 300,000 hectares.  There 
are no verifiable inventories of farmers on state lands or the amount of state land.   
21 See Bloch et al. (1988) and author interviews (Smucker and Delatour 1979; 
Smucker and Smucker 1979) with leaseholders on the offshore island of La Gonave and the 





due in large part to the high transaction costs.  Secondly, those with updated title cannot 
adequately defend their rights in a court of law.  Victor (1993) views insecurity as a permanent 
feature of Haitian land tenure and a direct product of the Haitian political system.
22 
What emerges from field studies is a generalized peasant distrust of the law, and primary 
reliance on social relations and customary arrangements to ensure access to land.  Most 
peasants are aware of procedures for formalizing land ownership.  They value updated title to 
land; however, customary arrangements are standard in virtually all peasant households. Co-
heirs may revert to the formal system to sell inherited land to outsiders (non-kin).  In most of 
rural Haiti, the formal system is a recourse of last resort in managing land conflict (see Murray 
1978a; Smucker 1983a).  
Peasants may turn to the formal system when the informal system proves unable to 
resolve conflicts over inheritance or rightful ownership.  This course of action is prohibitively 
expensive for most peasant households.  Recent research on land conflicts adjudicated by the 
courts has concluded that the courts are often unable to arrive at a definitive judgment, and that 
the judicial apparatus is generally unable to enforce its judgments (FAO/INARA 1997).  
Customary law privileges the possessor.  Peasant rights and claims are strengthened by 
continuous presence on land.  Co-heirs who remain on the land assume  
                                                 
22 Clear title does not provide protection from intervention by powerful outsiders, land 
invasions to reclaim lost land, or the takeover of unoccupied land, usually in the aftermath of 
changes in government (FAO/INARA 1997; Moral 1961).  Such incursions, however, are 
more commonly reported on state lands, peri-urban zones, irrigated zones, or sites with 





control of absentee shares and consolidate adjoining shares of inheritance into larger blocks of 
land.  Co-heirs and kinfolk have priority for land purchase.  Longstanding sharecroppers or 
leaseholders also enjoy priority over others for the opportunity to purchase (Smucker 1983b).  
Poverty is itself an important source of land tenure insecurity.  In a cash starved peasant 
economy, farmers find it difficult to expand their land base by purchase, and are not inclined to 
invest scarce savings to update title.  Furthermore, viable land holdings are not transmitted intact 
to the next generation.  Subdivision gives each member of the next generation a stake in the 
land—however meager that stake might be.  This is a two-edged sword: people have a stake in 
the land—a social safety net and access to land through of customary law, but for most people 
the land base is inadequate by traditional peasant standards.  Mintz (1974b) describes this as a 
“concealed proletariat”—land-poor smallholders who rely heavily on agricultural day labor or 
other intermittent sources of income.  The overall system redistributes the wealth in land, 
mitigates poverty, and, in effect, shares the poverty.  
The FAO/INARA study (1997) assessed the formal land tenure system and concluded 
the following: (a) the judicial system is incapable of guaranteeing land tenure security even for 





generates land conflict and insecurity.
23  This tends to confirm Victor’s assessment that agrarian 
law is contradictory and ill adapted to the rural social context and Haiti’s customary system 
(Victor 1993).  For example, the FAO/INARA study identified five separate means of formal 
entitlement, a situation that generates rival ownership claims.  
Tenure security is significantly undercut by the absence of a functioning, independent 
judiciary to ensure enforcement.  Most peasants are virtually excluded from due process by the 
inaccessibility of courts.  There are no courts in Haiti’s 565 rural sectional jurisdictions, and only 
a small number of courts are authorized by law to judge land disputes.  The lower courts most 
accessible to peasants have very limited formal authority over land disputes.  FAO/INARA 
notes that the courts are interminably slow, corrupt, and politicized.  Therefore, broad based 
reforms and a viable system of justice are essential pre-conditions for land tenure security.
24 
Haiti today lacks a comprehensive, operative system for recording land ownership.  
Victor (1993) supports the cadaster as an essential tool in reforming the system, but notes that 
Haitian laws on cadaster have never been implemented and cadaster projects have generally 
failed.  The government together with foreign agencies or investors has carried  
                                                 
23 See Chapter 2, La sécurité foncière et ses garants:  “…il n’y a en Haiti aucune 
garantie ou sécurité foncière opposable à tous.”  See Chapter 3, La gestion des conflits: droits 
et propriété et tribunaux:  “Le dysfonctionnement des institutions préposées à assurer la sécurité 
foncière…est générateur d’insécurité foncière et producteur de conflits fonciers, violents ou 
larvés.” 





out cadastral surveys as an element of project investment or agro-industry.  This has sometimes 
had the effect of excluding peasant smallholders (FAO/INARA 1997).    
Local cadasters were undertaken in irrigated zones of Haiti’s Gonaives Plains (1974-
79) and the Artibonite Valley (1950s, 1980,1982).  In these cases, physical cadasters were 
undertaken with the promise of land reform, but delivery of title to peasants never materialized 
(Victor 1993).  It is also interesting to note that landowners within the perimeters of these local 
cadasters have commonly made a choice not to register subsequent land transactions despite 
the offer of free registration.  There is some evidence of success in the use of physical cadasters 
to regulate water rights—an approach based on water users within an irrigated perimeter—
regardless of tenure status (Hauge 1984).  
In a context of high risk within the statutory system, it is hardly surprising that peasants 
rely heavily on extra-legal maneuvers.  The customary system offers a more manageable level of 
risk.  Customary arrangements lower financial and transaction costs.  They are flexible and 
adapted to daily realities of peasant decision-making.  For the vast majority, the informal system 
assures at least minimal access to land—the pivotal asset of peasant livelihood.  Peasants use 
mixed patterns of tenure to defray labor costs, ensure cash flow, and meet social obligations 
based on kinship ties or patron-client relations.  Finally, the customary system is locally 
controlled and addresses household imperatives to manage risk, enhance social security, and set 
aside an insurance fund.   
The literature on Haitian land tenure describes a context of legal pluralism.  In current 





peasants are more concerned with security in tenure rather than tenure security.  That is, secure 
access is not defined by title security.  Rather, peasant smallholders are concerned most of all 
with stability of access.  Assured access is largely dependent on kinship status and one’s 
personal stock of social capital.
25   
4.    TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND TENURE 
The vast majority of Haitian peasants claim land ownership through formal and informal 
procedures.  At issue is whether peasants feel secure enough to adopt agricultural technologies 
and invest in their land.  This section first reviews the results of previous studies on tenure and 
the adoption of agricultural technologies and then presents new evidence from the agroforestry 
impact survey conducted by the Pan American Development Foundation.  
RESULTS FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES 
National Food Security Baseline Survey 
Between 1994 and 1996, USAID funded the Baseline Survey, a national-level survey on 
food security that included questions on land tenure, adoption of agricultural technologies, 
inputs, production, demography, and nutrition.
26  This survey of 4,026 households  
                                                 
25 See Locher (1988), Murray (1978a) and 1979), SACAD/FAMV (1994a and 
1994b), and Bloch et al. (1988).  McClain et al. (1988) collected data on length of occupancy 
for all tenure types, finding a high incidence of lengthy periods of tenure even for short-term 
forms of tenure. 
26 Under USAID sponsorship, three NGOs, CARE, the Adventist Development and 
Relief Agency (ADRA), and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) conducted the food security 
Baseline Survey, each in a different region of the country.  The Bureau of Applied Research in 
Anthropology (BARA), University of Arizona, analyzed and published the findings.  For the 









generated the most comprehensive set of household data of the 1990s and the only national-
level data relating tenure, adoption, and productivity.  Wiens and Sobrado (World Bank 1998) 
analyzed the data to better understand the dynamics of rural production and poverty.  Only the 
findings related to tenure will be reported here. 
First, Wiens and Sobrado examined simple correlations between tenure type and 
agricultural practices.  Five types of land access—purchased, inherited-and-divided, rented, 
sharecropped, inherited-and-undivided—were tested against four types of practices—cropping 
pattern, degree of crop diversification, input intensity, and the adoption of soil conservation 
techniques.  Wiens and Sobrado tested the partial correlations while holding area cultivated and 
area of good or mixed quality soil constant, as these variables may be associated with particular 
tenure patterns and may mask other relationships if not held constant. 
As judged by partial correlation coefficients with p £ 0.05, they found no significant 
relationships between tenure and agricultural practices tested, except for sharecropping.  
Sharecropping was positively correlated with the proportion of agricultural output represented 
by corn, rice, and chickens, and negatively associated with growing vegetables and other cash 
crops.  Sharecropping was not negatively associated with purchased input, but was negatively 
associated with the practice of fallowing. 
Next, Wiens and Sobrado prepared a regression to predict crop output per hectare 
using data on 2,922 farms.   Though the regression was highly significant, again, variables 





negatively related.  In addition, they found that sharecropping had productivity levels 72 percent 
of the average. 
Finally, Wiens and Sobrado tried to determine the characteristics of “successful” 
peasants.  This they defined as those who worked at least 0.3 hectares and had relatively high 
levels of crop productivity and household expenditures.  They prepared a logistic regression to 
determine the probability of being successful or not.  Again, the distribution of tenure types was 
not significantly different between the successful and unsuccessful peasants at p £ 0.1.  
Successful peasants had no different access to their land than did unsuccessful peasants.  This 
finding corroborated another result from the entire sample of households: farmers own (including 
access via purchase, divided and undivided inheritance) approximately two thirds of all land 
worked regardless of income level.  Wiens and Sobrado concluded that tenure was not 
generally a constraint on technology adoption or on production and increases in income.  Their 
findings on sharecropping were consistent with interpretation of sharecropping as a mutually 
advantageous practice to mitigate risks on marginal land. 
Local Level Project Studies 
Perhaps the majority of agricultural and natural resource management projects have 





in contrast to broader based rural development projects.
27  Some of these projects have 
assessed the relationship between tenure and technology adoption.
28 
The most pertinent study was Smucker (1988) who carried out field research and 
summarized findings from six community studies assessing factors affecting peasant planting of 
project tree seedlings.  He found that peasants preferred to plant on purchased and divided 
inheritance lands; however, they regularly planted on undivided inheritance lands and other 
short-term forms of tenure.  In some communities with less purchased land available, the 
majority of trees were planted on undivided inheritance lands (Buffum 1985).  In all six 
communities, peasants planted trees on rented and sharecropped plots in addition to owned 
plots.  In a separate, but related survey, Conway (1986) surmised that planting trees on 
undivided land was a strategy to enhance individual claims to specific portions of jointly inherited 
land. 
After reviewing the evidence from Conway (1986) and six community studies, Smucker 
(1988) concluded that peasants expressed a clear but far from exclusive preference for 
adoption on purchased and divided tenures.  These findings corroborated those of a similar 
study assessing correlations between tenure and adoption of soil conservation methods (Pierre-
Jean and Tremblay 1986).  Smucker surmised that, although the tenure system as a whole was 
                                                 
27 See White and Jickling (1992) on projects offering a limited menu of technologies, 
and Durette, Manuel de l’agronomie tropicale (1991) on rural development projects.   
28 Zuvekas (1978) and Murray (1978a) reviewed the literature on tenure and found no 





characterized by insecurity, this limitation was commonly overcome by personal ties and 
obligations, and did not prevent peasants from planting trees on a broad range of tenure types. 
In the area of Les Anglais in southern Haiti, McClain et al. (1988) carried out land 
tenure research and tested for tree cover, tenure categories, and length of occupancy.  They 
noted a strong correlation between length of occupancy and degree of tree cover regardless of 
tenure category—including trees on typically short-term tenures such as sharecropping.  This 
remarkable finding, that tenure categories and length of occupancy were not significantly 
correlated, suggests that sharecropping and rental arrangements were renewed regularly and 
provided uninterrupted access comparable to long-term categories of tenure.  The 
FAO/INARA study in nine different agro-ecosystems lends some support to this finding (1997). 
White and Runge (1994, 1995) assessed the collective adoption of watershed 
management in multi-owner watersheds of Maïssade.  The study asked two questions: (1) what 
factors were associated with individual choice to participate in the collective management 
activity; (2) what factors were associated with the emergence of watershed management 
regimes?  White and Runge found no significant difference between the tenure status of 
participant and non-participant groups, and no significant difference in the distribution of tenure 
types in successful and unsuccessful watersheds.  The emergence of successful watershed 
regimes was explained by two factors: significant economic gain from the action, and a critical 
mass of social capital derived from labor exchange practices and the existence of producer 





In a context where labor commonly substitutes for cash as a medium of exchange, 
White and Runge concluded that labor in times of need was effectively more important than 
cash or tenure.  The need for labor and the social organization of labor diminished the potential 
for disputes over tenure.  The authors further concluded that a preoccupation with tenure status 
was misplaced, and deflected attention away from social and cultural determinants of access to 
land.  Land title or tenure type was not the key factor, but rather the degree to which individuals 
were incorporated in a nexus of enduring and well adapted set of personal and social relations 
(White and Runge 1995). 
The sum of local level project evidence suggests that farmers make investment decisions 
based on their perception of prospects for long-term access to a plot—regardless of its tenure 
status, including investments that actively enhance their prospects for long-term access.  This 
suggests that perceived stability of access to land—via stability of personal and social 
relationships—is a more important determinant of technology adoption than mode of access. 
NEW EVIDENCE: THE PADF IMPACT STUDY 
The Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) implements the Productive Land 
Use Systems (PLUS) project financed by USAID.  This agroforestry extension project 
provides plant materials and technical assistance to interested farmers, and has reached 
100,000 hillside farmers since 1992.  In 1996, PADF carried out an impact survey of PLUS 
farmers that included information on land tenure and adoption of agroforestry practices 





however, comparison with household data reported by Wiens and Sobrado (1998) suggests 
that both samples represent similar populations in terms of access to land and soil fertility.
29   
The survey collected data on all plots worked or owned by 1,540 peasant households 
for a total of 5,663 plots, and additional information on 2,295 plots having project-inspired 
agroforestry practices including site characteristics, crop yields, technician observations, and 
farmer perceptions of agroforestry practices adopted.  The sample represented 5.6% of the 
27,728 farmers who had adopted project technologies prior to January 1, 1995.  The survey 
was repeated in the spring of 1998 with 931 farmers (1 percent of eligible farmers) and 1,658 
plots. 
Tenure and Plot Characteristics 
Bannister tested for correlations between tenure and plot distance from the residence, 
area, topographic position, slope, elevation, erosion, and farmer perception of  
                                                 
29 The number of persons per household is the same (5.78 for Wiens and Sobrado, 5.6 
for PADF), but other characteristics of the household are somewhat different.  PADF 
households contained on average 54% males, with 85% of heads of household being male.  The 
corresponding percents for the Wiens and Sobrado sample were 49% and 72%, respectively.  
The average percent of heads of household having six or fewer years of school was 58% for 
Wiens and Sobrado, but 85% for the PADF sample.  The average size of the total holdings per 
household was 1.7 hectares for PADF, 1.78 hectares for Wiens and Sobrado.  Of this total, the 
PADF households averaged 1.26 hectares owned (purchased plus inherited), and 0.59 hectares 
in good or mixed soil quality.  The corresponding numbers for Wiens and Sobrado were 1.20 
hectares and 0.62 hectares, respectively.  Purchased plot area accounted for 37% of PADF 
households’ total area, and 32% of the Wiens and Sobrado households’ total area.  The largest 







30   Residential garden plots were more likely to be purchased.  Farmers had 
purchased 49 percent of residential plots, 35 percent of nearby plots, and 37 percent of distant 
plots.
31  Among plots visited by technicians, sharecropped plots were somewhat more distant 
than plots in other tenure categories.
32  Purchased plots averaged 0.53 hectares, significantly 
larger than divided, undivided, and sharecropped plots.  This suggests that buying/selling 
markets have worked against the poor.
33  
The survey found no significant differences between tenure types in terms of elevation, 
topographic position, slope, or severity of erosion.
34  There were statistically significant 
differences in soil fertility (see Table 2).  A higher percent of purchased plots were in the high 




                                                 
30 Tenure categories in the PADF survey included some state rentals and plots managed 
by caretakers for absentee landlords.  These categories are not noted here, as they were not 
introduced in earlier discussion of the land tenure system, and are not directly pertinent to the 
focus of this paper.   
31 3 by 5 cross tabulation, Pearson’s chi-square, p-value .000. 
32 Kruskall-Wallis test, p-value .000. 
33 Kruskall-Wallis test, p-value .000. 
34 3 by 8 cross tabulation, Pearson’s chi-square, p-value .694. 
35 Soil fertility was described for each visited plot on a five point qualitative scale by the 
farmer being interviewed, one being very infertile, 5 very fertile.  Responses were recoded into 
the three categories shown in Table 2.  These categories are apparently the same as those used 
in the Wiens and Sobrado study.  However, in the PADF study fertility information was 
collected only for the subset of household plots actually visited.  The Wiens and Sobrado study 






Table 2: Percent of plots in three soil fertility classes by tenure category 
  Farmer’s evaluation of soil fertility   
Tenure  Low  Medium  High  No. of plots 
Purchased  14  37  49  948 
Divided inheritance  13  45  42  324 
Undivided inheritance  19  38  43  482 
Sharecropped  18  38  44  189 
Rented  22  41  38  284 
Notes: Pearson’s chi-square p-value for the 3 by 5 cross tabulation is .001. 
 
Tenure and the Adoption of Agroforestry Technologies 
Sampled farmers had installed project technologies on 41 percent of available plots and 
reported significant yield increases.
36  Previous studies indicate that project soil conservation 
structures can significantly increase yields.  Crop yields were measured by technicians in 
farmers’ plots during a series of case studies conducted in January 1995 (Lea 1995a, 1995b).  
Increases of 70% in sorghum yield were noted in hedgerow gardens and increases of 60% to 
120% in rock wall gardens in controlled experiments on adjoining plots.   
Overall, the impact survey indicates that farmer decisions to adopt new technologies are 
correlated with several plot characteristics in addition to tenure.  Table 3 shows the percent of 
project plots in each tenure category.  Hedgerows, which are relatively easy to install, are the 
most commonly adopted technology.  Undivided inheritance, sharecropped, and rented plots 
have higher adoption rates for hedgerows than purchased or divided inheritance.  The opposite 
                                                 
36 The PADF impact survey asked farmers questions regarding the differences in crop 
yield they attributed to the presence of soil conservation structures, but the authors do not 
consider these recall responses reliable.  Haitian farming systems contain a large number of 
crops, harvest is sometimes done in stages and in small amounts, new crops are sometimes 





is true for crop bands, gully plugs, trees, and top-grafting.  For those technologies, the highest 
adoption rates are found in plots with purchased or divided inheritance plots.  For rock walls, 




Table 3: Percent of project plots by tenure and technology adoption, 1996 survey
a 




Gully plug  Trees




Purchased  54  6  29  19  55  11  948 
Divided Inheritance  59  4  29  11  47  12  324 
Undivided Inheritance  63  4  27  16  51  9  482 
Sharecropped  68  2  32  16  23  4  189 
Rented  67  3  36  16  23  4  284 
P-value
c  .000  .033  .078  .017  .000  .000   
Notes: 
a Row percents do not sum to 100 percent because most plots had more than one project 
practice. 
b Trees seedlings raised by the farmer with project assistance and planted on the plot 
during 1995. 
c Pearson’s chi-square significance for the 2 by 5 cross tabulation for each practice. 
 
The 1998 survey shows adoption by tenure category for all plots controlled by 
participating households (see Table 4).  Adoption rates are somewhat different from those of 
Table 3, but in general they confirm the previous findings.  Table 4 shows that adoption rates for 
hedgerows are higher for undivided and sharecropped plots than for divided, rented, and 
purchased categories of tenure.  Crop bands, gully plugs, and trees are more frequently adopted 
on purchased plots.  Rented and purchased plots have the highest percent of rock walls.  Top 
                                                                                                                                                 
confusion regarding whether or not the question referred to crops in the alleys or crops grown 
within the structures themselves. 





grafting is still found more frequently on purchased and divided plots, but the differences are not 
significant.  Notably, percentages of soil fertility (Table 2) and soil conservation practices 
(Tables 3 and 4) are quite similar across different tenure types.  Based on these results, an 
extension program would not need to target technologies towards or away from any particular 
tenure type.   
 
Table 4: Percent of all household plots by tenure and technology adoption, 1998 
survey
a  











Purchased  24  5  15  8  36  4  1382 
Divided 
Inheritance 
19  4  12  7  33  4  517 
Undivided 
Inheritance 
29  2  13  7  34  2  688 
sharecropped  28  3  8  4  20  2  299 
Rented  23  2  16  4  16  3  432 
P-value
c  .002  .004  .011  .044  .000  .086   
Notes: 
a  Row percents do not sum to 100% because most plots had more than one project 
practice 
b Tree seedlings raised by the farmer with project assistance and planted on the plot 
during 1997 
c Pearson’s chi-square significance for the 2 by 5 cross tabulation for each practice 
 
 
Although not a project intervention, the presence of mature trees on a plot represents an 
important form of technology adoption.  Bannister assessed the correlation between tenure and 
mature trees per hectare and found significant differences: there were more trees on purchased 
and divided inheritance plots (Table 5).
38   These results could indicate preference for investing 
                                                 
38 All trees on the plot, either planted with project assistance or otherwise, having a 





in land with long-term over short-term tenure.  They may also suggest a pattern of asserting 
ownership claims by planting and maintaining trees on undivided plots.  A similar analysis found 
more mature trees per hectare on plots with higher fertility (Bannister 1998b).   
 
Table 5: Number of adult trees per hectare by tenure category
a 
  No. of trees per hectare  No. of plots 
 
Divided inheritance  103
a  324 
Purchased  88
a  946 
Undivided inheritance  69
b  481 
Sharecropped  61
b  189 
Rented
b  56
b  283 
Notes: 
a   Kruskall-Wallis test, p-value .000; numbers followed by the same letter are not 
different at the 95% level of probablity (multiple comparisons done by paired 
Mann-Whitney tests with Bonferroni correction). 
  b  Private rental, doesn’t include leasehold on state land 
 
 
Correlation between technology adoption and soil fertility (Table 6) is as important as 
the relation between adoption and tenure status.  This is perhaps to be expected since tenure 
status and soil fertility are also related (Table 2); however, farmer assessments of fertility also 
appear to integrate other productive factors not measured by laboratory analysis of soil nutrient 
levels.
39   
                                                 
39 PADF had soil analyses performed on a randomly selected subset of 175 plots, 35 in 
each of the five qualitative categories, to determine if there was a relationship between farmers’ 
perception and amount of soil nutrients as measured in the laboratory.  No such relationship was 
discovered.  There were no statistically significant differences in soil acidity or in the levels of soil 
nutrients (Ca, Mg, K, P) among the levels of fertility as perceived by farmers.  Nor were there 
statistically significant relationships between the laboratory fertility findings and farmer’s 
qualitative perception of soil depth, degree of “heat” (on a qualitative hot/cold scale) of the soil, 





Table 6: Percent of fertile and infertile plots with project agroforestry practices, 1996 
survey
a 










Fertile plots  54  6  33  19  48  12  1032 
Infertile plots  64  3  27  15  44  7  1263 
P-value
b  .000  .007  .001  .026  .036  .000   
Notes: 
a  Fertile plots are those with soils in the top two categories of the 1- to 5-point fertility 
scale; infertile plots are those with soils in the bottom three categories. 
 
b  Pearson chi-square significance for the 2 by 2 cross tabulations. 
 
Tenure appears to influence adoption in five of six technologies surveyed.  Trees and 
grafted fruit trees are more common on purchased and divided inheritance plots.  The value of 
tree products increases over time, so farmers need to protect their rights to harvest.  Crop 
bands and gully plugs are also more common on purchased or divided inheritance plots.  This is 
likely attributable to the high value of perennial food crops in crop contour bands (pineapple, 
plantain, sugar cane) and the economically important crops planted in soil collected by gully 
plugs (plantains, taro).  Hedgerows are more commonly found on plots with other modes of 
access.  Hedgerows are relatively easy to install, so this may reflect a strategy of risk 
minimization when trying a new practice or fulfilling project requirements to install soil 
conservation measures. 
Tables 3, 4, and 6 show that tenure and soil fertility are both associated with adoption in 
parallel fashion.  Technologies (crop contour bands, gully plugs, trees, top-grafted fruit trees) 
more common on purchased and divided inheritance plots are also more common on fertile 
plots, and conversely (hedgerows).  Bannister’s evidence does not allow clear separation of the 





which is more important in a particular decision to adopt new technology.  Bannister’s analysis 
(1998b) finds no association between tenure status and differences in management.
40  Although 
overall analysis of PADF data indicates that mode of access to land is an important variable, the 
data show no definitive relationship between tenure status and adoption. 
5.    CONCLUSIONS 
THERE IS NO DEFINITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TENURE AND ADOPTION 
BY PEASANTS 
A broad range of studies on Haitian peasant agriculture and tenure find no simple and 
definitive relationship between tenure status and willingness to adopt agricultural technology.  
Levels of investment are quite similar across tenure types.  Important exceptions to the general 
rule include the following: (1) other things being equal, peasants prefer to plant and graft trees on 
purchased or divided inheritance lands, and (2) peasants prefer to adopt certain soil 
conservation techniques—particularly hedgerows—on parcels with shorter-term tenures such as 
rental or sharecropping, perhaps to strengthen their claims or rights of access to that land, or 
perhaps to reduce the risk of adopting the new technology.  Notably, these two preferences are 
far from exclusive and peasants frequently plant trees and establish hedgerows on all types of 
                                                 
40 Technicians evaluated the management quality of hedgerows, crop contour bands, 
rock walls and gully plugs.  Observations were made on the percent of rows well managed, 
percent of rows poorly managed, the number of breaches larger than 25 cm per 100 m, and 
whether or not the farmer repaired the breaches.  The statistical tests found no significant tenure 






tenure.  This supports the basic contention that tenure is not the preeminent criterion for 
investment. 
Approximately 60 percent of all agricultural parcels are purchased or divided 
inheritance plots (see Table 1); therefore, tenure is not a constraint for adopting technologies 
with long time horizons such as tree planting or grafting on the majority of parcels in Haiti.  The 
various studies also suggest that tenure is not a constraint to agricultural intensification and soil 
conservation on the vast majority of parcels.  However, agricultural research and extension 
services are available to only a small fraction of Haitian households. Despite continuously high 
peasant demand for agroforestry extension, Haiti’s most significant effort to date reached just 
25 percent of all peasant households over a ten-year period, and then ceased.
41  Peasants 
continued to plant trees spontaneously in the wake of this outreach program albeit on a smaller 
scale.  The key constraint to wider adoption and continued extension services was not land 
tenure but funding levels and the absence of a permanent institutional base for extension. 
Local-level studies suggest that certain other factors are at least as important as tenure 
in peasant decisions to adopt.  These factors include the relative size and fertility of available 
plots, proximity of plots to a farmer’s residence, stability of access to land, and the quality of 
local social capital resources (e.g., kinship and other special ties and obligations, traditional 
rotating labor and credit groups, grassroots peasant organizations).  Where stocks of social 





leasehold and sharecropping.  This finding also holds for adoption of complicated watershed 
management regimes in degraded watersheds with multiple ownership.  
The importance of these factors sheds light on the alleged preeminence of tenure as a 
constraint, and the fundamental importance of social capital in agricultural development.  These 
results also suggest that development agents should give a higher priority to assessing and 
strengthening local social capital resources rather than updating title to land. 
There is an important caveat to the finding that tenure does not generally constrain 
technology adoption.  The research reviewed in this paper examines relations between tenure 
and technology adoption by peasant farmers.  Therefore, findings from these studies may not 
hold for potential adopters who are not integrated into peasant society or influenced by 
traditional peasant social and cultural relations.  Such cases would include the modern, capital-
intensive agricultural sector and land marked by speculative values in urban areas, transportation 
arteries, and some lowland irrigation works.  For this reason, the conclusions drawn in this 
paper pertain primarily to traditional, peasant smallholders. 
PEASANTS ARE PREOCCUPIED MORE BY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
INSECURITY THAN INSECURE TENURE 
For most peasants in Haiti, the basic source of insecurity is poverty not tenure.  The 
agrarian poor are preoccupied above all with protecting themselves in a broader context of 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 This was the Agroforestry Outreach Project (AOP) and Agroforestry II (AF II) 
projects funded by USAID between 1981 and 1991 and implemented by the Pan American 





political and economic insecurity.
42  This insecurity goes far beyond land tenure and the normal 
risks of rain-fed agriculture on degraded sites.  The pivotal constraints on peasant investment 
are political and economic uncertainty and the growing scarcity of productive land.  Formal 
instruments of land registration, title, and the judicial process have high transaction costs and do 
not ensure land tenure security.  Therefore, the peasantry’s first line of defense is access to land 
via kinship ties and other social capital resources.  The Haitian land tenure system is unlikely to 
evolve toward a more public, formalized system unless there is progress in solving underlying 
sources of insecurity, including an agricultural sector in severe crisis and the absence of credible 
recourse in a court of law. 
In this sense, peasants are more interested in personal security than tenure security.  
They manage land access rights to enhance personal security.  They seek security in tenure 
rather than tenure security.  The formal system, derived from the state, is not responsive to 
peasant needs, nor is it credible, transparent, fair, and affordable.  Peasant incentives to update 
title will remain weak unless more fundamental problems are addressed. 
Haiti’s informal land tenure system provides a modicum of social security via flexible 
and affordable land transfer and tenancy.  The system prioritizes concerns for stability of access 
over particular modes of access to land.  Due to impoverishment, most peasants are 
preoccupied with food security and risk management in a context with little margin for failure.  
                                                 
42 Political uncertainty includes but is much broader than the elections cycle or its 
absence.  Peasant farmers have historically been excluded from the national political system, and 
the Haitian state has been deeply marked by a predatory character, few public services, 





Peasants promote food security by strategic management of their social capital resources, 
including access to land. 
POLICY MAKERS SHOULD PRIORITIZE RURAL SECTOR AND BROADER 
JUDICIAL REFORMS RATHER THAN TINKER WITH THE TENURE SYSTEM 
The sum of evidence suggests that Haiti’s land tenure situation is largely compatible with 
smallholder agricultural development.  Furthermore, rural poverty and technological stagnation 
are due to fundamental constraints other than tenure.  These constraints are driven by the 
paucity of investment in human and social capital and rural infrastructure, lack of investment in 
agricultural research and extension, deficits in capital and credit markets, lack of off-farm labor 
opportunities, a dysfunctional judiciary, and disenfranchisement of the rural majority. 
In general, the evidence suggests that intensification and landscape wide rehabilitation 
will not be achieved simply by diffusing a limited range of technologies.  Such technology 
transfer is often very useful but its impact is generally marginal—both in terms of economic and 
environmental impact.  The evidence suggests that smallholder agriculture in Haiti has 
successfully intensified where fundamental constraints are alleviated and indigenous social capital 
has diminished peasant insecurity.  Haitian peasants have long demonstrated their ability to 
adapt tenure maneuvers to new conditions and new opportunities.  
Ultimately, formal land tenure insecurity is a subset of the generalized insecurity that 
peasants experience in their dealings with the legal system and the state.  Land law reform is 
certainly needed, but premature investment in national cadaster and titling amounts to tinkering 





addressed, titling programs run the risk of undermining goals of enhanced tenure security and 
agricultural intensification.  At the very least, a viable system of justice is an essential pre-
condition for land tenure security and title reform.   
Investment in cadaster and titling programs is undoubtedly premature until there is clear 
demand for it from the peasantry, and unless titling programs are implemented directly at the 
local level, building on local concerns and local economic opportunities rather than the interests 
of powerful outsiders.  Pre-conditions for such programs include local demand, access to credit 
and markets, and a functioning system of justice. 
Titling programs could prove useful in the long run, once peasants have gained an active 
voice in the political system and peasant rights are better protected in the law and related formal 
institutions.  In the meantime, in order to address rural poverty and modernize the agricultural 
sector, policymakers should focus on the fundamentals and the creation of an enabling 
environment for change. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Prevailing property rights theory predicts that in situations of land scarcity, tenure 
arrangements evolve towards more private and individuated tenures and that these forms are the 
most efficient.  In Haiti increasing land scarcity and population pressure have coincided with 
private property, but these rights have remained relatively insecure, informal, and not fully 
individualized—a land regime characterized by legal pluralism.  In this light, the attenuated status 





evolution of non-formalized resources of social capital, and the distributional concerns of 
peasants.  Given these fundamental conditions, it appears to us that the trajectory of Haitian 
customary tenure remains largely efficient—and will remain efficient unless the fundamental 
conditions change.   
Despite the growing scarcity of land, the critical issue in rural Haiti remains access to 
labor and social capital resources.  Social capital mediates access to land.  Labor substitutes for 
scarce cash—the most scarce of the classic factors of production.  In effect, labor is the primary 
medium of exchange in rural Haiti, the primary currency of social relations, and the primary 
vehicle for personal security and survival.  
This paper has addressed some aspects of Haitian land tenure but much more work 
remains to be done.  New avenues of research and a broader diffusion of information on land 
and justice issues could help diffuse a tendency toward polemic and favor a more reasoned 
debate over agricultural policy and the requirements for legal-political reform in Haiti. 
Useful lines of research might include the following: further study of rural land disputes 
and their disposition in Haitian courts, additional field research on the social and economic 
impacts of the few cadastral surveys initiated in the country, field research on informal 
mechanisms for regulating land disputes and on institutional alternatives to statutory mediation 
that build on these informal mechanisms, political analysis of the constraints to reforms in the 
legal system, and piloting institutional innovations that may contribute to enhancing the security of 
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